Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
1998

Willingness to pay for industrial recruitment: A look at local
decision-maker activity versus citizen preference
Beth Ann Loy
West Virginia University

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Loy, Beth Ann, "Willingness to pay for industrial recruitment: A look at local decision-maker activity versus
citizen preference" (1998). Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 896.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/896

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses,
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU.
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR INDUSTRIAL RECRUITMENT:
A LOOK AT LOCAL DECISION-MAKER ACTIVITY
VERSUS CITIZEN PREFERENCE

THESIS

Submitted to the College of Agriculture and Forestry
of
West Virginia University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Science

by

Beth A. Loy, MS

Morgantown, West Virginia
1998

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would first like to thank my parents, Betty and Gary Loy, for their tremendous
support. They have encouraged me to learn and for this I will always be thankful.
Thanks Mom and Dad-I love you! I would also like to thank my grandparents, Glenna
and Ersel Loy, for instilling a solid work ethic in me by genuine example. Thank you
Memaw and Granddad-I miss you tremendously. An additional thanks goes to Aunt
Helen for her words of wisdom and a special thanks goes to Linda, Denetta, Kathleen,
Kendra, Janet, and Anne for their encouragement and support. Thanks also to M.B. for
the view.
I would like to send my gratitude to Dr. Scott Loveridge for his guidance
throughout the development of this research. Thanks goes to Dr. Gary Winn for being a
great mentor. Thanks also to West Virginia University’s Agricultural and Resource
Economics Department for their cooperation.
I would like to acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions: Dr.
Alan Collins, Dr. Virgil Norton, and Dr. George Morse, Ron Althouse, Christa Foster,
and Mike Wadsworth. I would also like to thank the WVU Regional Research Institute,
the Tennessee Valley Authority Rural Studies Program, and the Northeast Regional
Center for Rural Development for funding the data collection phase of this research.
Thank you to other members of my committee, Dr. Gerard D’Souza, Dr. Peter V.
Schaeffer, and Dr. Tom Torries, for their knowledge and assistance. Thanks to WVU’s
Job Accommodation Network, Institute for Research and Training, and the College of
Human Resources and Education for their support. I would like to send my
appreciation to all who contributed their time and effort in the development of this thesis.

iii

Table of Contents

Chapter One: Introduction

1

Chapter Two: Literature Review

3

Chapter Three: Method

12

Chapter Four: Preferences of Local Economic Developers
Sample
Results
Ohio
Kentucky
Virginia
West Virginia
Developer Willingness to Pay
Discount Rate
Odds of Success Versus Rankings of Importance
Economic Indicators

18
18
18
18
19
19
19
19
21
33
36

Chapter Five: Preferences of West Virginia Citizens
Sample
Results
Respondent Characteristics
Citizen Willingness to Pay
Discount Rate

38
38
38
38
38
39

Chapter Six: A Comparison of West Virginia Citizens and West Virginia
Developers

43

Chapter Seven: Summary and Conclusions

47

References

51

Appendix A: Telephone Survey Local Economic Development Survey

55

Appendix B: Citizen Telephone Survey

63

Abstract

69

Vita

70

Approval of Examining Committee

74

Statement of Copyright

75

iv

List of Tables

Table 2-1: Recent Incentive Packages

5

Table 4-1: Developer Willingness to Pay

20

Table 4-2: Developer Willingness to Pay ($)

21

Table 4-3: Discount Rate Results

25

Table 4-4: Significant Willingness to Pay Differences (p-values)

26

Table 4-5: Significant Willingness to Pay Differences (jobs)

29

Table 4-6: Significant Willingness to Pay Differences (states)

30

Table 4-7: Developer Odds of Success Versus Rankings of
Importance (Average)

35

Table 4-8: Economic Indicators of the Study: 1995

36

Table 5-1: West Virginia Citizen Willingness to Pay

39

Table 5-2: West Virginia Citizen Willingness to Wait 5 Years
For Additional Job Creation

40

Table 5-3: West Virginia Citizen Willingness to Spend Any Money at All
to Attract Company

41

Table 6-1: Ranking Comparisons: West Virginia Developer Versus Citizen

43

v

List of Figures

Figure 4-1: Developer Willingness to Pay
Ohio
Kentucky
West Virginia
Virginia

23

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The local economic development policy literature is critical of industrial
recruitment, yet use of this policy option is widespread. Industrial recruitment is an
increasingly used and controversial local economic development tool. Previously limited
to manufacturing, recruiters have recently expanded their scope to include enterprises
such as airports and professional sports teams. Regional economists and local policy
analysts have loudly attacked the more generous incentive packages.
Economic development practice has diversified over the past few years, with
some resources going to alternative strategies such as investments in infrastructure,
existing businesses, and business startups. The dominant local economic development
strategy, however, continues to be industrial recruitment, i.e., local developers seeking to
attract manufacturing branch plants and plant relocations to their community. Most
academic research in the area of economic development policy recommends that more
resources be directed towards strategies such as business retention and expansion,
fostering local entrepreneurship, and amenity development. The policy recommendations
seem to have been ignored as industrial recruitment remains the most popular strategy
for local economic development groups.
This research moves beyond criticizing industrial recruitment policy and explores
one potential reason for practitioners’ reliance on recruitment over other available local
development techniques. The research also investigates developer’s assessment of
probability of success for industrial recruitment as well as alternative development
strategies.
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Objectives of this research are:
1. To test one reason, a high discount rate, for the gap between what
researchers recommend and what local economic developers practice;
2. To look at developers’ evaluation of the probability of success for various
development techniques and see if this matches their development technique
preferences; and
3. To test citizen preferences regarding industrial recruitment, seeing if developer
actions coincide with citizen preferences.
The research will examine whether economic developer use of incentive
packages to recruit local businesses is supported by the general public. Are local
economic developers accurately representing citizen preferences? Are developers
acting rationally? A mail survey of local economic development practitioners estimates
their discount rate while a phone survey looks at citizen preferences. A brief review of
trends in recruitment and the academic arguments against the practice will follow. How
a high discount rate might be a strong reason for local economic developers to prefer
industrial recruitment over other policies will then be discussed.
Survey design and results of a pilot study from surveying Ohio economic
developers will be addressed followed by survey results estimating the discount rate of
local economic development officials in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia. A look at
whether developers are acting rationally, in accordance to what citizens desire, will be
viewed in the context of a survey of West Virginia citizens. A final section summarizes
preferences by comparing states with regard to odds of success and developer
willingness to pay as well as preference differences between citizens and development
officials. Limitations, future research, and conclusions follow.
2

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
As the United States developed economically, leaders focused solely on
prediction to begin building a local economy. In other words, if an area was predicted to
be a success, a business would locate there. When the United States had significant
frontier regions, businesses concentrated on identifying those regions with the greatest
potential for future growth. Firms cared about profit more than market share and chose
to locate away from rivals.
Whatever the location choice, it was unlikely that the firms would choose a
location that minimized total travel cost. The firms’ optimal locational decision depended
on the specifics of consumers’ demands for spatially differentiated products (Nicholson,
1995). Most businesses were independent organizations that produced goods in one
location so as to increase profits because of locational advantages. With the 1930s
implications of temporal uncertainty and risk aversion moved prediction aside and
developers began to concentrate on an economic movement called industrial
recruitment. Regions with little or stagnant development began to adopt strategies of
recruiting manufacturing firms away from the more developed and high wage areas.
Advances in transportation and telecommunications made it possible for areas
previously overlooked to compete. Several studies have shown that recruitment has
been the most widely used tool for rural economic development (Bartik, 1995; Gibson,
1993; Summers, 1993; Rasmussen, 1985; Smith, 1988). Despite efforts by regional
economists to direct efforts away from recruitment and toward policies such as
expansion of existing business and the building of development networks, a paradigm
shift has not occurred. With the manufacturing industry existing as the economic base
of many communities, local developers attempt recruiting as a means of community
3

growth (Fox and Murray, 1993). Economic developers continue to concentrate on
recruitment strategies in the 1990s, while regional economists continue to question
whether this is good practice.
For the last decade the nation has been hard hit by an epidemic of runaway
companies who first take advantage of millions of dollars in state tax abatements to set
up shop and then leave town in search of lower wages, less regulation, and better tax
breaks elsewhere (State Ties: Legislation…, 1993). Local communities are then left
with the loss of millions of dollars in tax incentives along with job losses.
One does not have to look very far to find cases where industrial recruitment
appears to have run amok. For example, the State of Pennsylvania gave Volkswagen
$71 million in incentives in 1978 for the promise of 20,000 jobs (Mahtesian, 1994). For
ten years Volkswagen seemed to be having a positive impact on the economy but by
the end of the ten year period, the plant had closed. In 1988, the State of West Virginia
sued Newell Corporation for $614.6 million after Newell acquired Anchor Hocking
Corporation and announced it would move 942 jobs from Clarksburg, WV to Ohio
(LeRoy et al., 1994). West Virginia had already given the plant $3.5 million in loans.
West Virginia’s governor threatened to use eminent domain while the mayor and state
legislators also supported the workers. After Newell provided additional support to
dislocated workers and helped the state market the plant, the suit was settled, with
West Virginia recovering only part of the incentives given to Newell.
In another case, Chrysler backed out of promises made to the State of Wisconsin
in return for training grants and pollution allowances. Chrysler announced the shutdown
of its 5,500 worker assembly plant in 1988. The State came close to suing the company
while the United Auto Workers (UAW) Local 72 did sue (LeRoy et al., 1994). The State
4

and UAW alleged abuse of development subsidies in Detroit, where the jobs were
headed. The suit was eventually settled with Chrysler giving assistance to the
dislocated workers. Another union, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers (OCAW)
sued American Home Products Corporation in 1991 under the Racketeer-Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act for violating US and Puerto Rico laws after
American Home closed its 775 worker plant in Elkhart, Indiana. Most of the jobs were
relocated to Puerto Rico where profits are virtually tax free. The parties settled on the
eve of trial in 1992 for $24 million (LeRoy et al., 1994).
Pooling reported data on some of the higher profile incentive packages in recent
years shows that particularly in the Appalachian region, recruitment seems to be getting
more expensive per direct job created (Table 2-1).
Table 2-1
Recent Incentive Packages
Selected USA States, 1980-1996
State

Incentives

Company

Year

(per job)

Tennessee

Nissan

$11,000 1 1980

Tennessee

Nissan

$26,000 1 1985

Illinois

Sears

$40,000 2 1986

Kentucky

Toyota

$50,000 2 1988

South Carolina

BMW

$71,0001 1992

Alabama

Mercedes

$160,0003 1993

Kentucky

Dofasco/Co-Steel

$350,0002 1994

West Virginia

Parsons & Whittemore

$1,000,0004 1996

Sources: 1Graham S. Toft’s “ Industrial development in the new economy” presented at the May 21-22, 1996, National Conference
National Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC. 2“Tax giveaways to entice business backfire on states” USA Today, October 10,
1995. 3Chris Farrel’s “The economic war among the states” presented at the May 21-22, 1996, National Conference National
Academy of Sciences in Washington, DC. 4 Martha B. Hodel’s “Pulp mill permit process near end” March 8, 1996, CumberlandTimes News (page 2-B). Note: This was offered only; the deal was killed after environmental and labor groups objected.
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Rural communities such as those throughout most of West Virginia may continue
to attract some lower-skilled labor, but they are unlikely to attract high-skill, high-wage
jobs (Loveridge, 1996). This means incentives may bring in a low-wage company and
“create” jobs in the short run but over the long term, the community is choked by the
high price the community had to pay for the company initially. The recruited company
starts to struggle and looks for a new place to locate. Communities then begin to bid for
the company and incentives draw the company away from its current location. The
current location often cannot compete with new incentive offers. The commitment the
community gave up to encourage the move drains the budget and usually is not
replenished. Increased tax rates due to the original incentive package coupled with lack
of skilled workers often leaves a community in shambles.
Based on these incentive packages and others, incentive costs have spiraled out
of control-up to $150,000 per manufacturing job (Waits and Heffernon, 1994). Regional
economists have begun examining these location incentives such as tax breaks and low
interest loans, as well as the public costs and benefits of providing incentives. Do
incentives make good business sense? The answer, in most cases, is no (Bartik, 1995;
Meyer, 1991; Pluta, 1980). Research results differ regarding the impact of industrial
recruitment; however, the Calumet Project for Industrial Jobs reported that many
businesses receiving tax breaks are not following through on the promise of additional
jobs (Isadore, 1990). The group found that businesses receiving tax breaks under the
Economic Revitalization Area Program in Hammond, IN, during 1988 had a tax savings
of $15 million and promised 805 new jobs on average. The study found that none of the
businesses met their expectations. Five businesses even totaled 101 job losses from
those they had available before being awarded a tax break.
Few communities have stringent measures to follow when giving incentive
packages to recruit new companies. For example, nine of 34 states responding to the
National Governors Association (NGA) report having any reporting requirements for
6

companies that receive incentives (LeRoy et al., 1994). Only twenty-five states reported
to the Council of State Governments in late 1993 that they have any written guidelines,
including rules or criteria, for determining whether to give a company incentives and
what types of incentive to give. Also, two-thirds of the 36 states responding to the
National Association of State Development Agencies could not even say what
percentage of their incentive dollars were going to various types of businesses (LeRoy
et al., 1994).
The Louisiana Coalition for Tax Justice studied ten years of industrial property
tax exemptions. The Coalition found that almost three-fourths of the projects created no
new jobs (LeRoy et al., 1994). From these data it is clear that the total cost and cost
per job of incentive packages for recruitment of major manufacturers such as
automotive plants has not only increased dramatically in recent years but increased with
little regard to proper forecasting and accountability measures.
Why have costs risen? The shift of the United States economy from
manufacturing to services has created stress in state and local governments.
Governors, mayors, chambers of commerce, county commissioners, and developers
are struggling to replace manufacturing jobs lost to automation, obsolescence, and
trade. State leaders have no more important agenda than to promote and preserve the
economic security of those they serve. This means creating jobs. But at what price?
Businesses that have bolstered a state’s economy and have helped support vital
government services for decades have been neglected as competitors receive
handsome subsidies to locate a few miles away (Edgar, 1993). Support of these
companies comes at the expense of policies that promise to enhance a state’s
economic viability in the long term. These programs are pushed aside for instant
gratification and short term political credit.
As more and more regions feel the stresses associated with the changing
economy, more resort to offering incentives, bidding up the “price” of a successful
7

recruitment effort. The current preponderance of thought, however, suggests that
incentives are only short run fixes (Waits and Heffernon, 1994). Regional economists
have analyzed recruitment practices and the variety of effects it can have on a local
economy. This research has highlighted the negative aspects of recruitment. Loveridge
(1996) summarized six of the arguments in the following manner:
•

Zero-Sum Game: No jobs are created by moving a business from one
location to another. Individual communities may gain or lose but national
income and the employment rate remain the same.

•

Long Odds: The number of communities pursuing recruitment has
increased over the last few years. However, the number of firms available
within the United States has remained fairly constant. For example, 200
to 300 “significant” new firms per year have been courted by 15,000 local
economic development agencies (Phillips et al., 1993).

•

Giving Away The Store: Businesses understand that communities are
willing to pay to attract them and they can easily play one community
against another for the best deal. In the process, communities overbid.

•

Pyrrhic Victory: Incentives used to recruit a new business drain the local
economy and usually mean that the changing tax base does not cover the
full cost of new service needs. These costs are passed on to existing
businesses and residents with increased taxes and fees and reduced
services.

•

The Hollow Economy: Because the imported firm has a high propensity
to rely on imported inputs and sell its semi-finished products outside the
economy for final processing, importing a firm from somewhere else does
8

not have the same impacts on the economy as a firm that develops locally
(Maki, 1994). The recruited firm, therefore, has a more significant linkage
to the exterior economy than the local economy.
•

The Profit Cycle: Firms that relocate are usually seeking lower wages
and generally compete in producing a standardized product that requires
little skill (Markusen, 1985). Recruiting these low skill, low wage jobs to the
local economy does little to improve the overall workforce through on-thejob training. The tax base also produces little chance of financing
development of physical infrastructure and next-generation human capital.

With the growth of incentives coupled with the negative long term effects has
come the rise in public resentment. LeRoy et al., (1994) highlights the case of the
mayor from Flat Rock, Michigan. After granting Mazda a 14 year tax abatement, the
mayor was voted out of office in 1985. Much of the public in Flat Rock and elsewhere
considers outrageous incentive packages “corporate welfare” that favors select
companies at the expense of other potential uses for the tax money (Labor Blows…,
1994).
Despite the research highlighting the negative aspects of recruitment and public
resentment, local developers continue to seek firms through recruitment. Recruiters
believe that incentives create a business-friendly, entrepreneurial climate; promote local
job opportunities and worker training; enhance private sector productivity and
competitiveness (Farrel, 1996). Strategies that focus on the existing economy are given
only secondary attention despite research showing that up to 80% of new jobs are
created by existing firms (Kraybill, 1995).
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Research has concluded that two new strategies would help a community
develop better than simply concentrating on industrial recruitment. First, the retention
and expansion of existing firms and second, maintaining a focus on market-based
incentives. Both are more effective than industrial recruitment (Ross and Friedman,
1990; and Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). New economic development efforts such as
these are geared to enhancing existing state businesses, developing new indigenous
companies, and products, and expanding into the international market.
These new strategies are grounded in regional economic growth theory. Public
investments in indigenous industries lead to the expansion of existing firms and the
creation of new firms through forward and backward linkages (Markley and McNamara,
1995). Most often the company in question-seeking a massive incentive package-is an
absentee, multi-plant corporation with few or no roots in the community and little
concern for the local impact of its behavior (LeRoy et al., 1994). Companies then run
away with public resources.
With research supporting other types of economic development, what drives
economic developers’ preference for recruiting? One potential explanation is that they
may have a high discount rate. The higher a developer’s discount rate the more a
developer is indicating preference for investment in short term, quick payoff
development policies. Local economic development strategies that do not involve
recruitment programs are often perceived to have longer payoff periods than
recruitment-related strategies. Economic leaders prefer quick turnaround activities even
though they are high risk. Community leaders witness a rapid turnover in local
institutions supporting economic development, so they perceive a need to pursue
policies that pay off quickly, before support erodes. In the remaining chapters of this
10

work one potential reason for the popularity of industrial recruitment, high discount rates
among developers, is explored. Citizen preference is also addressed, analyzing
whether developers are acting rationally with respect to development policy.
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CHAPTER 3: METHOD
An important part of this study is to look at developer and citizen preferences. To
test the theory that developers look to industrial recruitment because they have a “high
discount rate,” the study focuses on valuing jobs using the contingent valuation method
(CVM). To test whether developers are acting rationally (in accordance with citizen
preferences) citizen willingness to pay for industrial recruitment (citizen’s willingness to
pay extra taxes for industrial attraction) was also measured using CVM. Are developers
looking to score big numbers of jobs in the short term and do citizens support developer
activities? Are developers and citizens willing to pay more for jobs in the short term
versus the long term? How much tax money would the economic leader be willing to
spend or give up from the available tax base and how much tax money would the citizen
be willing to give up for a firm to relocate to the service area? To answer these
questions, CVM was chosen as the method to determine job value.
The CV Method is a way of assigning a value to a non-market good. The CV
Method estimates social values for a resource for which there is no known price
associated. Because the value of a job is difficult to quantify and CVM has been used
successfully in helping evaluate environmentally related resources, CVM was chosen to
dispense workable data. The CV Method was used as this study’s centerpiece to bring
together quantifiable measures of how much individuals are willing to pay for jobs.
The CV Method first came into use in the early 1960s when economist Robert K.
Davis used questionnaires to estimate the benefits of outdoor recreation in a Maine
backwoods area (Mitchell and Carson, 1990). Ciriacy-Wantrop (1947) first illustrated
CVM by saying that individuals should be asked how much they are willing to pay for
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additional quantities of an extra-market good. CVM can be used to estimate the value
of nonmarket resources as well as public goods.
The name of the method refers to values revealed by respondents. They are
contingent upon the constructed or simulated market presented in the survey. The
simulated market is a vital part of the evaluation because the hypothetical market must
be described accurately for accurate results. Otherwise, the survey is measuring values
with questions that will not predict true willingness to pay for the good or resource. If
the attributes can be described accurately, contingent valuation survey techniques can
provide valuable information about the nature of demand (Cameron and James, 1987).
Recently, contingent valuation has been involved with three “real world”
controversies. According to Portney (1994), two federal laws and one oil spill led to the
developments of a set of guidelines for the application of CVM. The Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, otherwise known as
CERCLA or the Superfund law, required the use of techniques that would be admissible
for estimating damage from environmental hazards. Then, in 1989, the Exxon Valdez
spilled millions of gallons of crude oil into the sea around Alaska, killing wildlife and
harming businesses that depended on common goods such as fish for their survival.
Congress responded by passing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. Under this law, the
Department of Commerce, acting though the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, or NOAA, was directed to write its own regulations governing damage
assessment (Portney, 1994). NOAA has since established a set of guidelines for CVM
use. Some guidelines are:
1. Personal interviews are the preferred method of measuring willingness to pay
or willingness to accept.
13

2. The CV Method should use the referendum format.
3. The CV Method applications must start with an accurate scenario.
4. Respondents must understand that the amount they are willing to pay would
reduce the money they have available for other goods.
5. The CV Method must reference substitutes available to the respondent.
6. The CV Method should have one or more follow-up questions (a debriefing) to
make sure respondents understood their choice and to discover the reasons for
their answer.
The CV Method is currently growing in use with litigation proceedings involving
compensation for environmental losses, especially with government involvement. The
growth in popularity has triggered the use of CVM to other markets. Economic theory
continually suggests that the price sensitivity of demand for a good is an excellent
predictor of the necessity of that good to the population. When public valuation is the
object of measurement, a well-designed contingent valuation survey is one way of
consulting the relevant experts-the public itself (Hanemann, 1994). Thus, CVM has
been applied outside the environmental forum to a wide range of public goods and will
be applied to job valuation in this study.
According to Cameron and James (1987) there are three types of contingent
valuation questions. First are “open-ended” where the respondent is asked to name the
sum. Second, “sequential bids” ask whether or not respondents would pay or accept
some specified sum (the question is then repeated using a higher or lower amount,
depending on the initial response). Third are “closed-ended” questions. Here, the
respondent is asked only whether or not they would pay or accept a single specified
sum, varying the sum across respondents.
14

Subjects must be confronted with a specific and realistic situation rather than an
abstraction. Also, questions should be framed as if participants were voting on a
referendum (Hanemann, 1994). Part of this study (determining developer willingness to
pay) follows methods used in initial CVM studies, survey respondents were simply
asked “How much would you pay for good X?” These dollar values were then seen as
the minimal amount the respondent would be willing to pay and used to predict overall
discount rates.
Another part of the study (determining citizen willingness to pay) follows the
methods used by newer research studies (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Cameron and
Huppert, 1991; and Cameron and James, 1987). These studies modified the open
ended questions, saying respondents became too frustrated with question form.
“Closed-ended” questions have the advantage of being easy on the respondent. The
pricing scenario mimics the take-it-or-leave-it market decisions made daily by most
individuals (Cammeron and Huppert, 1991).
Critics of CVM say there are a variety of general problems that can arise when
using the method. If not accounted for, problems can distort contingent valuation
results and render willingness to pay results useless. However, some believe
willingness to pay may measure a respondent’s warm glow and not be a true measure
of willingness to pay. Participants, they say, may respond with a higher willingness to
pay because it makes them feel better about themselves. For example, the individual
may be happier just knowing that the jobs exist. Even though Milgrom (1992)
contended that altruistic values play no significant role in research results, measures
were taken to avoid these pitfalls as much as possible. Most importantly this research
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began with a pilot study that not only helped assess areas needing clarified and/or
modified for future surveys but obtained useful and consistent results.
The survey instruments in this study developed a hypothetical scenario in which
a computer software company was considering moving to the respondent’s area,
bringing 10 of its employees with an average wage/benefits package of $30,000 per
year. The computer software company was chosen as an environmentally neutral high
technology firm. The scenario allowed respondents to focus on the value of the jobs to
their area without concerns of pollution.
The scenario emphasized that the company would not be hiring any local
workers, only bringing its existing workforce to the area. The rationale was to avoid
potential bias from individuals who might think they or their family members or friends
would be eligible for the jobs. Similarly, the scenario used a small firm (10 employees)
to avoid bias from benefits to landowners. The scenario thus focused on developer
willingness to pay and citizen willingness to pay for less tangible benefits such as
community self-esteem, better tax base, and more diversified services that might accrue
to areas that attract newcomers. Ohio, Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia economic
developers answered a mail survey (See Appendix A) and West Virginia citizens
answered a telephone survey (See Appendix B).
The telephone survey to West Virginia citizens used the same scenario but first
focused on the firm moving with 10 employees without reference to a five year change
of an additional six employees. The scenario, however, remained the same. Following
traditional contingent valuation methods, citizen respondents were first presented with a
non-negotiable yes-no bid function such as voters might face in tax levy votes in
regards to the 10 employee company making the move to the respondent’s service
16

area. The sample was divided into four subsamples: one quarter of the sample was
asked whether they would pay $50 in additional taxes in exchange for a guarantee of
the firm’s move to the area; one quarter was asked to indicate “yes” or “no” on $25; one
quarter on $10; and one quarter on $5.
Respondents were then asked if they would prefer the computer software
company to move now with 10 employees or in five years with 16 employees. The
question implied a 10% annual increase in local jobs created by waiting five years as
did the scenario posed to developers. Economic developers were first presented with a
question as to whether they would like the firm to move to their area with 10 employees
now or 16 employees five years from now. Developers were then asked to put a dollar
figure on their willingness to pay for jobs in their area.
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CHAPTER 4:
PREFERENCES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPERS

SAMPLE
Two mailings of the developer survey went to selected1 members of the Ohio
economic development association. This was the pilot study. Following minor changes,
three mailings went to members of the Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia economic
development association. The Ohio survey was mailed in the spring of 1996. Eightyone participants of the original 185 Ohio sample returned a survey with usable results
for a return rate of 44%. Forty-six participants of the original 109 Kentucky sample
returned a survey with usable results for a return rate of 42%. Thirty-four participants of
the original 78 Virginia sample returned a survey with usable results for a return rate of
44%. Seventy-seven participants of the original 177 West Virginia sample returned a
survey with usable results for a return rate of 44%. The samples included
commissioners, mayors, and members of development councils, community
development boards, development foundations, and chambers of commerce.

RESULTS2
Respondent Characteristics.
Ohio: Fifty-eight males and 23 females were included in the returned sample. The
sample population included representatives from eight of ten categories from the ruralurban continuum code. Surveys were returned from forty-seven metro counties and 34
from nonmetro counties. Counties considered completely rural were not represented,
because Ohio has no completely rural counties.

1
2

Members affiliated with educational institutions were dropped from the list as they are not likely to be involved in deal making.
Data were keyed into an Access (1995) database, coded with an Excel (1995) spreadsheet, and analyzed using SPSS (1994).
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Kentucky: Thirty-seven males, five females, and four of unknown gender were included
in the returned sample. The sample population included representatives from seven of
ten categories from the rural-urban continuum code. Ten surveys were returned from
metro counties, 24 from nonmetro counties, and 12 from rural counties.
Virginia: Twenty-six males, six females, and two of unknown gender were included in
the returned sample. The sample population included representatives from nine of ten
categories from the rural-urban continuum code. Twelve surveys were returned from
metro counties and 22 from nonmetro counties.
West Virginia: Fifty males, 21 females, and 6 of unknown gender were included in the
returned sample. The sample population included representatives from seven of ten
categories from the rural-urban continuum code. Sixteen of the sample were returned
from metro counties, 42 from nonmetro counties, and 19 from completely rural counties.
Correlations between variables discussed later in this paper and the rurality
continuum codes (Butler, 1990) for all surveyed states showed no significant
relationship, so urbanity of the respondent’s county is not considered in the analysis that
follows.
Developer Willingness To Pay. Are developers willing to pay for jobs in their service
area? How much are developers willing to pay for these jobs? To get a better
understanding of developer willingness to pay, several survey questions were asked to
reveal the respondents’ willingness to pay for jobs using the contingent valuation
method (CVM)3.

3

For more CVM information than is provided in Chapter 3, see Cameron (1988), Cameron and James (1987), Cameron and
Huppert (1991), Cooper (1993), Diamond and Hausman (1994), Hanemann (1994), Milgrom (1992), Mitchell and Carson (1990),
and Portney (1994).
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A 10% discount rate was imbedded into the CVM questions, with developers
being asked how much the community would pay to attract an increasing number of
jobs at various times in the future. As the time horizon increased, the number of
respondents willing to provide incentives decreased, also indicating a higher than 10%
discount rate for developers switching from the yes to the no column (Table 4-1).
Table 4-1
Developers’ Willingness to Pay
Job Scenario

Percentage of Developers Willing to Pay
OH
KY
VA
WV

Pay for 10 jobs now?

83% (N=67)

63% (N=29)

50% (N=17)

70% (N=54)

Pay for 11 jobs in 1 year?

74% (N=60)

67% (N=31)

50% (N=17)

48% (N=37)

Pay for 14 jobs in 3 years? 60% (N=49)

60% (N=49)

38% (N=13)

39% (N=30)

Pay for 16 jobs in 5 years? 52% (N=42)

41% (N=19)

30% (N=10)

35% (N=27)

Twenty-one percent (N=17) of the Ohio sample; 41% of the Kentucky sample
(N=19); 26% of the Virginia sample (N=9); and 42% (N=32) of the West Virginia sample
responded they would be willing to pay for the jobs to move to their area but did not
indicate how much they would be willing to give, making these responses unusable for
contingent valuation analysis. Nineteen percent (N=15) of the Ohio sample; 37% (N=17)
of the Kentucky sample; 47% of the Virginia sample; and 21% of West Virginia
developers stated they were not willing to give anything for the software company to
move to their service area.
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Discount Rate.
To test the hypothesis that developers have a high discount rate several
questions were asked (See Appendix B). When developers were asked, using an
implicit discount rate of 10%, if they would rather have the 10 employees today or 16
employees five years from now, 99% of Ohio developers; 91% of Kentucky developers;
91% of Virginia developers; and 95% of West Virginia developers responded that they
would rather have the firm today. With the high percentage of developers indicating they
would rather have the firm today, developers’ responses indicate strong support for the
hypothesis that they have a discount rate of higher than 10%.
The mean data were discounted over time, showing discount rates of 16% for
Ohio, 24.5% for Kentucky, 19% for Virginia, and 31% for West Virginia (Table 4-2). The
discount rates illustrate that developers from all states, particularly West Virginia and
Kentucky, prefer short term gains over long term investments.
Table 4-2
Developer Willingness to Pay ($)
Job Scenario

OH
High

Mean

KY
High

VA
Mean

High

WV
Mean

High

Mean

Pay for 10 jobs now?

300,000 51,130 150,000 28,649 70,000

Pay for 11 jobs in 1 year?

300,000 49,877 150,000 33,771 70,000 10,893 202,500 16,313

Pay for 14 jobs in 3 years?

381,818 45,841 140,000 29,513 50,000

6,500 100,000

9,619

Pay for 16 jobs in 5 years?

250,000 36,933 160,000 14,568 60,000

6,155 100,000

8,482

Discount Rate

16%

25%

9,500 202,500 27,777

19%

31%

Even the highest values in Table 4-2 are considerably less than the offers
reported in Table 2-1. Regional policy variations may have accounted for these
differences. Some areas, especially on the local level, may have enacted legal
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constraints on how much developers are able to award in incentives per term (i.e, year,
two years, five years, etc.). There also may have been differences due to developers’
implicit limits.
The mean data on developer willingness to pay for jobs were used to fit a line (Rsquares equal one) showing the relationship between time and payment:
OH

y = 51130.3 + 1210.5x – 28.182x2 + 70.793x3 (eqn. 1)

KY

y = 28649 + 8187.67x - 3281.9x2 + 216.225x3 (eqn. 2)

VA

y = 9500 - 3611x + 2558.5x2 - 340.5x3 (eqn. 3)

WV

y = 27777 - 15376x + 4314.5x2 - 402.21x3 (eqn. 4)

where y is the amount of incentive package the developer is willing to give and x is the
number of years from the current time period. The models show that on average,
developers indicated discount rates above the 10% discount rate embedded in the
scenario (Figure 4-1), and that these deviations from the generally accepted discount
rate increases nonlinearly with time. Projecting the results into year 7 yields a negative
value for Ohio; year 8 for Kentucky; year 7 for Virginia; and year 8 for West Virginia,
indicating that on average developers would not be willing to pay anything for activity
that far in the future.
Although the survey asked developers to give amounts in dollar terms, 23%
(N=19) of the Ohio sample and 3% (N=2) of the West Virginia sample gave willingness
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Figure 4-1:
Developer Willingness to Pay
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e: WV 10% Discounted Willingness to Pay
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g: VA 10% Discounted Willingness to Pay
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4

5

to pay in terms of percent of real and personal property tax alleviated over so many
years4. Of those responding to the contingent valuation questions involving how much
a service area would spend and/or give up in tax receipts for software jobs to locate in a
service area, 24% of Ohio developers; 28% of Kentucky; 66% of Virginia; and 4% of
West Virginia developers reported a constant break for the business. They decided
they would be able to give up the same amount across time, deciding the jobs were
worth a constant payout from their service area.
Only 4% of Ohio respondents; 20% of Kentucky respondents; 3% of Virginia
respondents; and 13% of West Virginia respondents gave answers indicating a discount
rate lower than 10%, i.e. they were willing to pay more in the later years of the
scenario. Another small group (4% for Ohio; 11% for Kentucky; 21% for Virginia; and
13% for West Virginia) was not consistent in the amounts they would pay for the jobs,
increasing the amounts in some years, decreasing in other years. The remainder of
these subsamples: 18% for Ohio; 9% for Kentucky; 10% for Virginia; and 22% for West
Virginia, had a discount rate higher than 10%, and were willing to pay less for the jobs
further in the future (Table 4-3). Individual developer dropoffs were significant enough
to push discount rates above ten percent for each state.

4

To convert these percentages into current dollar values, 12 independently owned software firms, similar to the hypothetical
software firm created for this study, were surveyed by telephone. Approximate real and personal property tax amounts were
obtained. Average real and property tax bills were discounted at 10% over the period of time developers wished to relieve the
software company. This amount took into consideration the percentage of tax burden the individual developer chose to relieve.
These amounts were then divided by the number of jobs available at the software firm for the current year of development, giving a
willingness to pay per job.
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Table 4-3
Discount Rate Results
Decreasing Developer Willingness to Pay Over Time (%)
OH

KY

VA

WV

Dollar Terms

17% (N=14)

9% (N=4)

10% (N=3)

22% (N=17)

Percentage Terms

11% (N=9)

0

0

1% (N=1)

With the high percentage of developers choosing a constant payout in dollar and
percentage terms over time it appears developers have a discount rate of 10%.
However, these results are open to two interpretations. On the surface it appears that
many developers have a discount rate of 10%, but this is not consistent with their
response to the earlier question, in which they all preferred 10 jobs now to 16 jobs five
years from now. A second possibility, which is more consistent with responses to the
earlier question, is that they have a discount rate higher than 10%, but limits on how
much they feel they can give firms are imposed upon them. So they respond with the
maximum in all cases.
Differences in developer preferences, indicated by p-values from t-tests, are
highlighted in Table 4-4. The p-values show the probability that the two samples came
from the same two underlying populations that have the same mean. The p-values are
considered significant if they are less than 0.05 and show the differences between
developer willingness to pay by state over time and between developer willingness to
pay by years in the future.
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Table 4-4
Significant Willingness To Pay Differences (p-values)

OH

State

Time
(yrs)

OH

0

KY

VA

WV

0

1

KY
3

5

0

1

VA
3

5

0

1

WV
3

5

0

1

1

0.60

3

0.45

0.49

5

0.15

0.15

0.30

0

0.07

0.07

0.17

0.41

1

0.19

0.19

0.36

0.77

0.60

3

0.10

0.10

0.21

0.50

0.92

0.69

5

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.10

0.04

0.12

0

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.43

1

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.03

0.58

0.76

3

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.20

0.40

0.27

5

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.18

0.40

0.27

0.92

0

0.06

0.05

0.14

0.34

0.91

0.52

0.85

0.10

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.02

0.09

0.04

0.12

0.80

0.16

0.29

0.03

0.03

0.08

3

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.44

0.98

0.77

0.37

0.37

0.00

0.16

5

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.35

0.81

0.59

0.54

0.54

0.00

0.10

Note: Bold p-values significant at the 0.05 level.
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3

0.78

5

Looking at differences within each state, developers had cut-off periods of when
they were more willing to pay for jobs versus when they were less willing to pay for jobs.
Developer willingness to pay was marked by developers dropping their willingness to
pay by a significant amount after a certain amount of time passed. Some developers
were more limited in their willingness to pay than others depending on state and
depending on the number of years the developer had to wait for the company to
relocate to their area. To summarize:
•

Ohio: No significant change in developer willingness to pay occurred over
time;

•

Kentucky: A significant change in developer willingness to pay occurred
between one and five years;

•

Virginia: No significant change in developer willingness to pay occurred
over time; and

•

West Virginia: A significant change in developer willingness to pay
occurred between one and three years.

Significant changes in developer willingness to pay over time existed in two of
the four sampled states, Kentucky and West Virginia. These two states have
economies considered to be the least stable of this study’s sample. Developers from
Ohio and Virginia, the two states from the study with the healthier economies in the
study’s sample, i.e., higher per capita GSP; lower unemployment rates; and lower
poverty rates, showed no significant differences in willingness to pay over time.
However, there were distinct drops in willingness to pay. Marked changes in developer
willingness to pay occurred for Virginia when paying for 11 jobs in one year versus 16
jobs in three years and for Ohio when paying for ten jobs now versus 16 jobs in five
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years. These results indicate that economic developers from even the healthiest states
have a limited amount they are willing to pay to recruit businesses to their area.
As for differences between states, developers varied in the amounts they were
willing to pay over time for jobs. Significant changes in willingness to pay occurred in
the following relationships:
•

Ohio developer willingness to pay at all time periods and Kentucky
developer willingness to pay at year five;

•

Ohio developer willingness to pay at all time periods and Virginia
developer willingness to pay at all time periods;

•

Ohio developer willingness to pay at all time periods and West Virginia
developer willingness to pay at year one, three, and five;

•

Kentucky developer willingness to pay between year one and year five;

•

Kentucky developer willingness to pay at year zero, one, and three and
Virginia developer willingness to pay at all time periods;

•

Kentucky developer willingness to pay at year zero and West Virginia
developer willingness to pay at year three and year five; Kentucky
developer willingness to pay at year one and West Virginia willingness to
pay at year one, three, and five; Kentucky developer willingness to pay at
year three and West Virginia developer willingness to pay at year three
and five.

•

Virginia developer willingness to pay at all time periods and West Virginia
developer willingness to pay at year zero and Virginia developer
willingness to pay at year three and year five and West Virginia developer
willingness to pay at year one.
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Looking more generally at developer willingness to pay the big change in willingness
to pay, developers choosing to pay versus not paying came when developers were
deciding between 11 jobs in 1 year and 14 jobs in 3 years. Table 4-5 shows p-values
from t-tests indicating the largest significant difference lying between these two
alternatives.
Table 4-5
Significant Willingness to Pay Differences (jobs)
Array 1

Array 2

P-value

10 jobs

11 jobs

0.346056

10 jobs

14 jobs

0.109242

10 jobs

16 jobs

0.016078

11 jobs

14 jobs

0.002187

11 jobs

16 jobs

0.019289

14 jobs

16 jobs

0.082285

The most significant differences (significant at the less than p = 0.01 level) were
between Ohio and Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia (Table 4-6). A significant
difference also existed between Kentucky and Virginia. One possible difference may be
the changes made to the survey following a look at the Ohio pilot results. The high
amount of surveys returned with percentages of taxes alleviated over time instead of
dollar amounts for willingness to pay prompted the addition that the software company
would invest $300,000 in real and personal property (See Appendix B). This seemed to
help developers in subsequent surveys assign a dollar amount more easily.
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Table 4-6
Significant Willingness to Pay Differences (states)
Array 1

Array 2

P-value

OH

KY

0.000854

OH

VA

0.000272

OH

WV

0.000879

KY

VA

0.006403

KY

WV

0.046286

VA

WV

0.072604

One possible explanation for the deviations in willingness to pay over time is that
developers are on short term contracts and want short term payoffs. The time
differences between a one year and a three year payoff may be where an inherent cutoff of willingness to pay lies. This cut-off could be related to developer contracts of
employment. Can contracts of employment reinforce developers to invest in the long
term? Options to eliminate pressure for short-term gains may be to extend contracts
and have longer operating budgets while maintaining incentives in the short term.
These changes could possibly result in developers looking away from industrial
recruitment to more long term growth investments.
Aside from survey changes, the differences may also reside in variations
between state economies. The following highlights some of the more predominant
differences:
Ohio
Ohio’s population ranks seventh in the country along with its total gross state
product which totals about $222.1 billion. Only three states have greater manufacturing
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output than Ohio. Ohio’s Gross State Product from manufacturing stands at 27.4%
with only three states having larger percentages of their GSP from manufacturing.
Ohio developers are, however, willing to give up more in incentives than the
other states (Table 4-2). The amount Ohio developers are willing to give up in
incentives does not drop off as significantly as Virginia, West Virginia, or Kentucky.
Thus, it would appear that because of the state’s strong manufacturing base, which
corresponds to a strong economy, developers look more to the long term.
Kentucky
Kentucky is a medium size state that ranks twenty-forth in population and twenty-fifth
in the size of its economy with a GSP of $67.5 billion. The largest component of
Kentucky’s economy is manufacturing, which accounts for 25% of GSP. Only six other
states have a greater percentage of the GSP come from manufacturing. Services, at
14.2% versus 18.8% nationally, take a smaller role with mining at 4% versus 3.4% of
GSP and agriculture at 3.4% versus 2% of GSP. It is possible that because of the
state’s above average unemployment rate of 5.3%, developers seem to be looking for a
quick turnaround and thus have a relatively high discount rate of 25%.
Kentucky developers are also willing to give up more in incentives as compared
to Virginia and stay in line with West Virginia in the short term, dropping off at a slower
pace over time (Table 4-2). Developers seem to be looking at the employment base
which currently focuses on manufacturing, wishing to expand this base, especially in the
short term. This is one possible explanation. The manufacturing base, coupled with a
high unemployment rate, may be pushing developers to seek short term fixes with large
incentive packages.
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Virginia
Virginia is a large state that ranks twelfth in population and eleventh in gross
state product at about $142 billion. Proximity to the nation’s capital leads Virginia to
derive a high percentage of its GSP from government, 19.1% versus 11.8% for the
nation as a whole, second in the nation. Virginia’s government sector output ranks fifth
in the nation. Because of the state’s dependence on governmental services and their
below average unemployment rate, developers seem to have less of a desire to use
incentive packages as a tool to recruit. Virginia developers appear to have a lower
discount rate than they would without their dependence on governmental services.
Virginia developers are also willing to give up less in incentives as compared to
West Virginia, Kentucky, and Ohio (Table 4-2). Services contribute 18.3%, similar to the
nation as a whole at 18.8%, while manufacturing contributes 16.2%, below the national
average of 18.6%.
West Virginia
West Virginia is a relatively small state, ranking thirty-fifth in population and thirtyeighth in the size of its economy with a GSP of $28.3 billion. The composition of the
state’s economy differs significantly from the national profile. Mining makes up 11.8%
of West Virginia’s GSP versus 1.8% for the country as a whole. This is the fourth
highest percentage in the country, while the dollar value of its mining is the seventh
largest in the country. Transportation makes up 13% of the GSP versus 8.8% for the
US, the second highest percentage among states while trade and services amount to
13.9% and 14.2% of the GSP. The state’s dependence on the declining industry of
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underground mining contributes to the state’s above average unemployment rate of
7.2%. Developers may have a desire to recruit using incentives. Developers appear to
have a higher discount rate than they would if the economy were more stable.
West Virginia developers are willing to give large amounts of incentives in the
short term but this drops off significantly over time (Table 4-2). West Virginia’s high
poverty rate (19.7%) along with high unemployment may be one reason developers look
to recruitment as a high payoff quick fix for West Virginia’s weak economy.
Odds of Success Versus Rankings of Importance.
Developers were asked if they were to implement certain types of economic
development techniques, considering each technique as separate and without
considering combinations of two or more, how their constituents would prioritize the
following types of economic development techniques:
•

Recruiting business from outside the area;

•

Expanding existing businesses;

•

Promoting area as a tourist destination;

•

Promoting area as a retirement destination;

•

Helping business startups;

•

Developing infrastructure;

•

Investing in worker training; and

•

Creating communication networks between businesses.

Developers were asked to rank these techniques from 1 to 7 (with 1 being type of
highest priority and 7 being of lowest priority). Developers were then asked to give their
estimate of the odds of success of these techniques. To judge what was meant by
successful, they were to assume they invested a three year effort to just recruiting
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various types of businesses from outside the area using techniques such as advertising
in trade journals, tax and other financial incentives, trade shows, developing sites, direct
mail, and visits to targeted firms. Developers were to consider their chances of creating
14 jobs that average $25,000 in wages and $5,000 in benefits (Appendix A).
Developers from all states in this study ranked industrial recruitment second in
importance to their portfolio, justifying it as an important part of their development
portfolio. However, developers ranked industrial recruitment low in odds of success.
Ohio and Kentucky ranked industrial recruitment seventh in odds of success with West
Virginia and Virginia ranking it sixth. Developers placed industrial recruitment high in
importance (1 being highest) but low in odds of success (9 being lowest), showing they
believe recruitment is an important part of their portfolio but has little chance of success
(Table 4-7).
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Table 4-7
Developer Odds of Success and Rankings of Importance
(Average)
Odds
Development Technique

Rank

OH

KY

VA

WV

OH

KY

VA

WV

Business startup investment

5

4

4

4

4

6

4

4

Existing business investment

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Tourist destination investment

6

8

5

5

5

5

5

5

Retirement destination investment

8

9

9

9

8

7

9

9

Industrial recruitment

7

7

6

6

2

2

2

2

Infrastructure investment

3

3

2

2

3

3

3

3

Worker training investment

2

2

3

3

6

4

6

6

Encouragement of buying inputs locally5

-

6

7

7

-

9

7

7

Communication network investment

4

5

8

8

7

8

8

8

Spearman Correlations show the lack of strength of the relationships between
the variables of “ranking of importance” and “odds of success” for each development
technique. There are positive relationships; however, they are not significant at the less
than p=0.01 level. The Spearman Correlations show the relationships between
variables at:

5

•

0.3810 (p=0.3520) for Ohio developers;

•

0.4667 (p=0.4667) for Kentucky developers;

Statement was added following the pilot study.
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•

0.0230 (p=0.0230) for Virginia developers; and

•

0.7372 (p=0.0230) for West Virginia developers.

Economic Indicators. Reasons for similarities and differences may be based on
several things, such as gross state product (GSP) from manufacturing, population,
unemployment rate, poverty rate, per capita GSP, and overall GSP. See Table 4-7 for
relevant data.

Table 4-8
Economic Indicators of the Study: 19956
Possible Influences

OH

KY

VA

WV

US

27.4

25

16.2

10.4

13.2

Population (millions)

11

3.7

6.4

1.8

263

Unemployment rate (%)

5.0

5.3

4.8

7.2

5.5

Poverty rate (%)

12.5

19.0

10.2

19.7

13.7

Per Capita GSP

20.19

18.24

22.14

15.72

GSP (billions)

222.1

67.5

141.7

28.3

GSP from manufacturing (%)

Correlation coefficients, though not significant at the 0.01 level, indicate the
following relationships:
•

A negative relationship of -0.6594 between percent GSP from
manufacturing and discount rates. The higher the state GSP from
manufacturing, the lower the inferred developer discount rate.

•

A negative relationship of -0.9426 between population and discount rates.
The higher the state population, the lower the inferred discount rate.

6

Data from the State Science and Technology Institute at 751 Northwest Blvd., Suite 305; Columbus, OH 43212.
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•

A negative relationship of –0.5772 between per capita GSP and discount
rates. The higher the state per capita GSP the lower the inferred
developer discount rate.

•

A positive relationship of +0.8771 between poverty and discount rates.
The lower the state poverty rate, the lower the inferred developer discount
rate.

•

A positive relationship of +0.8896 between unemployment and discount
rates. The lower the state unemployment rate, the lower the inferred
developer discount rate.

•

A negative relationship of -0.9637 between GSP and discount rates. The
higher the state GSP, the lower the inferred developer discount rate.

The relationships shown by the correlation coefficients validate that developers
from "healthier" states are more apt to look to the long term. "Healthier" states, those
with the higher GSP, population, percent GSP from manufacturing, per capita GSP, and
those with lower poverty and unemployment rates had developers who indicated lower
discount rates. Developers with lower discount rates were more likely to be
representing a stronger economy and more likely to be looking to long term investments
such as infrastructure and existing businesses. These results support the theory that
policies chosen by developers differ state to state and appear to be linked to the shape
of the developer's local economy. Data show the better the shape of the developer's
economy, the lower the developer's discount rate, the more likely the developer is to
look to long term investments.
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CHAPTER 5: PREFERENCES OF WEST VIRGINIA CITIZENS
SAMPLE
A random digit sample of West Virginia telephone numbers was used to identify
possible survey participants (See Chapter 3 and Appendix B). Data were collected,
between April 1 and May 14, 1997, by West Virginia University’s Survey Research
Center. Individuals answering the telephone were asked to identify the survey
respondent. This was the person over 25 in the household with the most recent
birthday. A total of 933 responses were obtained out of 1,163 eligible households, for
an 80% response rate.

RESULTS7
Respondent Characteristics.
Three hundred ninety-two males and five hundred forty-one females with an
average age of 49 years were in the returned sample. Twenty-two percent of
respondents indicated they had not voted in elections during the last four years.
Citizen Willingness to Pay.
Survey respondents were supportive of government action to promote economic
development. When asked, “Should subsidies be given to businesses at all?”, 66% said
“yes,” 13% said “Depends on the circumstances,” while only 20% said “no” (Table 5-1).
Results indicated that even at the lowest payment level of $5, slightly less than 50% of
respondents would agree to help finance a subsidy with their tax money. Respondents
who stated “no” to paying $5 for a subsidy were asked a follow-up question. Are
citizens willing to spend any money to bring the computer programming company to

7

Data were keyed into an Access (1995) database, coded with an Excel (1995) spreadsheet, and analyzed using SPSS (1994).
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their area? Overall, only 47% indicated they would, stating “yes” to either the bid or the
follow up question.
When West Virginia citizens were asked if they would be willing to pay additional
taxes to attract the hypothetical software firm, willingness to pay appeared to be limited
as shown in Table 5-1. Fewer than 50% of West Virginia citizens responding to the
survey agreed to pay to attract the hypothetical computer software company to their
area.

Table 5-1
West Virginia Citizen Willingness to Pay

Should subsidies be given to businesses?
Yes

66% (N=616)

Depends On The Circumstances 13% (N=121)
No

20% (N=187)

Discount Rate. On the question as to whether businesses should be given subsidies at
all, responses from those who were willing to wait five years were virtually identical to
those who preferred immediate payoffs, indicating there is no difference in general
attitudes towards subsidies between the two groups. As Table 5-2 indicates,
willingness to wait five years for additional jobs was strongly related to household
income.
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Table 5-2
West Virginia Citizen Willingness to Wait 5
Years for Additional Job Creation
When Should the Company Move?
Household Income ($000s)

10 Jobs Now (%)

16 jobs in 5 Years (%)

N

Less than 10

60

40

95

10 to 20

68

32

182

20 to 30

68

32

117

30 to 40

71

29

139

40 to 50

81

19

89

50 to 60

85

15

91

More than 60

82

18

132

Respondents appeared to prefer short term gains over long term investments,
choosing higher payoffs in shorter time periods. When respondents were asked if they
would prefer the software company to move now with 10 employees or in five years with
16 employees, most wanted the jobs immediately. Seventy-two percent preferred the
short term payoff of 10 jobs now to the long term payoff of 16 jobs in five years. In
accordance with this response, 29% of those preferring to wait five years were willing to
pay for the company to move immediately, showing support for the long term. Citizens
supported short-term payoffs with 55% of those wanting an immediate payoff of 10 jobs
willing to pay.
Is citizen willingness to pay related to the respondent’s ability to pay? In other
words is willingness to pay related to household income? Table 5-3 indicates that this
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may be true. However, it only appears to be the case where household income is very
low (less than $10,000). There are no noticeable differences between other levels of
income.

Table 5-3
West Virginia Citizen Willingness to Spend
Any Money at All to Attract Company
Willing to Spend Anything?
Household Income ($ ‘000)

% Yes

% No

N

Less than $10

38

62

104

$10 to $20

48

52

192

$20 to $30

42

58

121

$30 to $40

55

45

141

$40 to $50

46

54

90

$50 to $60

54

46

91

More than $60

47

53

132

To examine whether propensity to vote made any difference in willingness to
pay, responses of voters were computed. Respondents indicating a history of voting
had preferences similar (less than one-percent difference) to the full sample for the
willingness to pay levels of $50 and $25. The largest difference was at the $5 with
voters less likely than the full sample (with 44.4% versus 48.7% stating they would be
willing to pay) to be in favor of a $5 tax hike for recruitment policies.
The results of the citizen preference survey show that a small majority of West
Virginia citizens are willing to pay extra taxes to attract new employment to their area,
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even when the jobs are high paying and environmentally friendly. It can be construed
then that citizens would not support higher taxes for strategies in which the benefits are
less certain or the environmental effects more pronounced.
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CHAPTER 6: A COMPARISON OF PREFERENCES:
WEST VIRGINIA CITIZENS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPERS
Data show local economic developers are reflecting the preferences for citizens
who live in their areas when they emphasize policies that focus on short-run rather than
long run solutions. Sixty nine percent of citizens wanted immediate payoffs, choosing to
have the company relocate immediately with 10 of their own employees. This is not
significantly different from the percentage of developers who chose to have the
company relocate immediately. However, citizens differed from developers by not
viewing industrial recruitment as a vital policy tool. Citizens ranked it eighth in
importance as compared to developers ranking industrial recruitment second in
importance (Table 6-1).
Table 6-1
Ranking Comparisons:
West Virginia Developer Versus Citizen
Developer
Ranking

Citizen
Ranking

1. Business startup investment

4

7

2. Existing business investment

1

4

3. Tourist destination investment

5

3

4. Retirement destination investment

9

2

5. Industrial recruitment

2

8

6. Infrastructure investment

3

6

7. Worker training investment

6

5

8. Encouragement of buying inputs locally

7

9

9. Communication network investment

8

1

Development Technique
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Overall, citizens ranked communication network investment first in importance
and retirement destination investment as second in importance. Citizens wanted local
manufacturers to be assisted in finding local suppliers for their businesses rather than
buying their materials from outside the area. Citizens also wanted senior retirement
facilities created to encourage retirees to move to their area. Survey respondents did
average 30 years of residency in West Virginia which may have had some influence on
their choice of development technique importance.
The fact that citizens have had long-standing relationships with their communities
may have resulted in citizens wanting to protect their community from outside
influences. Citizens may have also been thinking about growth that would benefit them
personally. The average age of the respondent was 49 years old. Many may have
been thinking about retirement and how investment in retirement facilities could
potentially benefit them in the future.
A Spearman Correlation showed a negative relationship of -0.4017 between
rankings of developers and citizens for choice of technique importance. There is no
significant correlation between citizen and developer preference. A t-test indicates that
there was a significant difference between developer preferences and citizen
preferences at the p=0.001 level. More specifically, t-tests showed citizens significantly
differed among their preference for development technique in all but the following five
comparisons:
•

“Existing business investment” and “Tourist destination investment” with pvalue of 0.25;

•

“Infrastructure investment” and “Worker training investment” with p-value of
0.62;
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•

“Infrastructure investment” and “Business startup investment” with p-value of
0.19;

•

“Industrial recruitment” and “Communication network investment” with p-value
of 0.35; and

•

“Industrial recruitment” and “Business startup investment” with a p-value of
0.16.

There was essentially no preference between business startup investment
ranked seventh, industrial recruitment ranked eighth, and communication network
investment ranked ninth. There was also no preference between worker training
investment ranked fifth, infrastructure investment ranked sixth, and business startup
investment ranked seventh. In addition, there was no preference between existing
business investment ranked fourth and worker training investment ranked fifth. This left
the encouragement of buying inputs locally, retirement destination investment, and
tourist destination investment as the top citizen choices for development techniques.
Regardless of development technique preference, a majority of respondents at
all household income levels preferred immediate job creation. The margin of the
majority, however, increased substantially with household income, peaking in the
$50,000 range at 85%. Overall, West Virginia citizens appear to support the activities
West Virginia economic developers value, i.e., short term strategies. Both support and
promote economic development in the short term. However, citizens say initiatives
would need to be financed from existing revenue and do not necessarily believe the
answer lies with generating increased revenue to support business recruitment.
Any tax increase in West Virginia depends on passage of a levy and voter levies
in West Virginia must obtain 60% approval for passage. A $1 yes-no option would likely
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have received higher levels of approval than these data based on a $5 bid. However,
there is only a three-point shift with these data between the $10 and $5 responses. An
eleven-point shift between $5 and $1 would be required for 60% approval, making
passage of even a $1 tax increase to finance the recruitment of a business unlikely.
Therefore, it appears from these data that developers are more likely to be able to gain
financial support from those who want immediate payoffs.
West Virginia economic developers, who ranked industrial recruitment second in
importance for their policy portfolios, appear to be in line with the attitudes of West
Virginia citizens when it comes to seeking short term payoffs. Both groups do not
agree, however, that industrial recruitment as a development strategy should receive
the highest priority. Survey respondents appear to prefer short term gains to higher
benefits in the long run, reinforcing the high discount rate hypothesis. Though they
appear to be off target with their approach, these data do show economic developers
are acting rationally when they put the short term payoff potential at the forefront of their
development policy package.
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Before drawing conclusions from this study, several weaknesses of the method
should be mentioned. First, it is a survey-based study, and local economic developer’s
and citizen actions may differ from what they report in a hypothetical survey context.
Second, the study focused on states from one region; since economic development
policies differ from state to state, choice of states may have influenced the survey
results. Economic developers in very rural areas may have attitudes that are quite
different from those in more densely populated areas, skewing data.
Fourth, contingent valuation methods were used to look at how respondents
valued the software jobs. With CVM, it is important to understand that relatively lower
wages in rural areas are as acceptable as somewhat higher urban wages for equivalent
jobs (Marlin, 1990). Also, the subtleties of using the contingent valuation method
seemed to reduce the number of usable responses. This means willingness to pay may
be different between a rural and urban area, though not necessarily resulting in a utility
difference. The study was also designed to focus on a firm that had minimal
environmental impact on where it located. If the scenario differed and environmental
issues, i.e., aesthetic, air, and water pollution, were associated with the firm, willingness
to pay would differ. Also, the study recognizes the transfer of benefits at the national
level but focuses only on the local benefits issue. By doing this there may still be some
inherent job bias, where local residents, developers or citizens believe they would
directly benefit from any new jobs.
What are the implications of these research findings for public policy? Given the
limited scope of the study, it is too early to make concrete policy recommendations
regarding the discount rate hypothesis. Keeping this shortcoming in mind, the survey
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appears to support the hypothesis that economic developers have a high discount rate,
which in turn leads to the conclusion that they might rationally prefer the recruitment of
businesses over alternative local development policies.
The data show developers feel industrial recruitment is an important part of their
economic development portfolio but has a below average chance of success.
Economic developers ranked “helping existing businesses expand” first in importance
and first in chances of success. Recruitment followed existing business expansion as
the second most important while it ranked close to the bottom, sixth and seventh in
odds of success.
Are developers acting rationally? Do citizens demonstrate support for what
economic developers are doing with local policy? The data indicate citizens do support
existing development policy as long as no new funds are needed. Citizens say policy
initiatives must come from existing revenue. This shows that research institutions must
continually search for innovative and cost effective methods to grow a healthy economy
and supports educating the public about the viability and probability of success of
various methods. Citizens must be aware that economic development is a long run
process which requires attention and investment. They, in turn, may help move
developers toward a paradigm shift that focuses on long term goals with less emphasis
on industrial recruitment.
If future research results consistently show a discount rate of roughly 16%-37%,
then attention needs to be given to policies regarding local economic developers’ terms
of employment. Otherwise, too many public services will suffer due to the erosion of tax
bases from the growing popularity of incentive programs. Is it possible for an economic
developer on an annually renewable contract to take the long view? It seems unlikely.
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Thought should be given to extending contracts and operating budgets to longer time
periods, while still maintaining incentives to do a good job in the short run. Guidelines
and educational programs for local review committees would be helpful in explaining the
long term nature of the development process to results-oriented local leaders.
Also, a better understanding of recruitment and the factors that influence
developer choices are important to design better policies, helping communities grow
and educating citizens. Developer preferences appear to be in line with most of what
citizens want. Educating the public on what development techniques work for long run
growth may help with a paradigm shift. Developers act on rewards, incentives that
enhance their track record politically. Developers have a vested interest in citizen
opinion because citizens vote on whether to continue their employment. Developers, in
turn, act in accordance with what may help them politically. If developers are rewarded
for pursuing short term gains, they will continue to focus on industrial recruitment. If the
public demands long term investments, developer actions will follow.
Not only do this study’s results need to be verified through surveys of other
states and with other methods, future research related to these results will address
other potential reasons for the concentration of local economic development policy on
industrial recruitment. Future research should be based on the hypotheses put forth by
Loveridge (1996). These hypotheses demonstrate that there may be other valid
reasons, including a high discount rate, for communities and economic developers to
hold onto industrial recruitment as a way to aid local economic growth. In addition,
research should address:
•

The effect of more stringent follow-up reporting about the progress businesses
are making toward their incentive promises (Gabe and Kraybill, 1997);
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•

Cut-offs of breaks to businesses that do not have a good reason for missing
goals;

•

The possible repercussions of allowing additional legislation to support suing
companies when they do not meet their goals; and

•

The effect of local coalitions doing pre-feasibility studies to look for alternative
buyers and uses for existing structures.

Continued exploration of the reasons for the gap between research findings and
practitioner and citizen preferences will better focus the research and policy
conclusions. From this continued analysis, an accurate comparison of behavior and
results can be made. With a better understanding of citizens’ desires, practitioner
motivations, and service area constraints, better local economic policies can be
developed to promote long term growth.
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APPENDIX A
MAIL SURVEY

LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT SURVEY
PART I
Q-1
Often a community uses a variety of methods to help an area grow. First, assume that when
you use one technique you are not using any other. Then, please give your estimate of the
odds of success of creating over a 3 year period 14 jobs that average $25,000 in wages and
$5,000 in benefits using the following development techniques in your area:
A. 0 (No chance of success)
B. 1 in a 1000

C. 1 in 100
D. 1 in 10

Development Technique

E. 1 chance in 1
F. ? (Don’t know)

Odds (please circle one for each technique)

1. Helping business startups

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

2. Helping existing businesses expand

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

3. Promoting your service area as a tourist
destination

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

4. Promoting your service area as a retirement
destination

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

5. Investing in the recruitment of businesses from
outside your service area

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

6. Developing your service area=s infrastructure
such as telecommunication systems, computer
networks, housing, roads and bridges, airports

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

7. Investing in worker training

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

8. Creating communication networks between
businesses

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Q-2
Now pick what combination of two from the above techniques you feel would give you the
best chance of 1 to 1 odds (100% chance of success):
Number

and number
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Q-3
In Q-2, you selected two techniques that you believe would give you the best chance of
adding jobs to your community. Assume you invested a three year effort to just recruiting
the types of businesses listed on the next page to your area from outside the area using
techniques such as advertising in trade journals, tax and other financial incentives, trade
shows, developing sites, direct mail, and visits to targeted firms. You consider your chances
of creating 14 jobs that average $25,000 in wages and $5,000 in benefits to be:
A. 0 (No chance of success)
B. 1 in a 1000
Type of Business

C. 1 in 100
D. 1 in 10

E. 1 chance in 1
F. ? (Don’t know)

Odds Of Recruiting This Type of Business to Your Area
(please circle one for each type of business)

Transportation

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Communications

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Sanitary services

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Wholesale trade

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Retail trade

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Food and kindred products

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Tobacco products

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Textile mill products

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Apparel and other finished products made
from fabrics and similar materials

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Lumber and wood products, except
furniture

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Furniture and fixtures

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Paper and allied products

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Printing, publishing, and allied industries

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Chemicals and allied products

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Petroleum refining and related industries

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Rubber and miscellaneous plastics
products

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Primary metal industries

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Fabricated metal products, except
machinery and transportation equipment

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Industrial and commercial machinery;
computer equipment

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Electronic and other electrical equipment

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?
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Type of Business

Odds Of Recruiting This Type of Business to Your Area
(please circle one for each type of business)

and components, except computer
equipment
Transportation equipment

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Measuring and controlling instruments;
photographic, medical and optical goods;
watches and clocks

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

State and federal facilities

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Services

0

1 in 1000

1 in 100

1 in 10

1 in 1

?

Q-4
Other individuals have mentioned that lack of housing, a poor school system, or an unpleasant
strip of old buildings that detract from their community’s otherwise positive attributes have hindered
their ability to recruit businesses. Keeping in mind that there are many other possible weaknesses
in a service area, have your previous efforts in industrial recruitment helped you identify
weaknesses in your service area?

A. Yes → Proceed with Q-5 and Q-6
B. No → Proceed to Q-7

Q-5
Since these weaknesses have been identified, has this caused the community to implement
marketing efforts to make schools, housing, downtown areas, or other parts of your service area
more attractive to new business development?

A. Yes → Proceed with Q-6
B. No → Proceed with Q-6

Q-6
Given these weaknesses, is it the general perception of community decision-makers that the
unattractive aspects are the reasons for problems with recruiting?

A. Yes
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B. No

Or has it been documented by businesses going on record that these unattractive areas are the
reasons for problems with recruiting?

A. Yes → Proceed with Q-7
B. No → Proceed with Q-7
Q-7
If you were to implement certain types of economic development techniques, your constituents
would have an opinion related to your actions. Considering each technique as separate and
without considering combinations of two or more, how would your constituents prioritize the
following types of economic development techniques? Please rank from 1 to 7 (with 1 being
type of highest priority and 7 being of lowest priority).

Type

Please Rank from 1 to 7

Recruiting business from outside the area
Expanding existing businesses
Promoting area as a tourist destination
Promoting area as a retirement destination
Helping business startups
Developing infrastructure
Investing in worker training
Creating communication networks between businesses
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PART II
For the rest of the survey, please consider the following scenario:
There is a software company currently interested in building in your area. The company has a
solid future and is on the cutting edge of new computer techniques. The company has
purchased an option on land in your service area. The average wage for an employee at the
software company is $25,000 plus a $5,000 benefit package. You contact the company and
they tell you they might move today or they might move five years from now. The company’s
management also tells you the following:
1. The company currently has 10 employees and if it moves today they do not expect any new
jobs to be created; and
2. If management waits five years to move the company, it is expected to have openings for an
additional 6 employees.
3. The company will invest $300,000 in real and personal property.8
Q-8
Referring to the hypothetical example involving the software firm, if you had your choice of
alternatives, when would you like for the software company to move to your service area?
A. Today (10 employees)
B. 5 years from now (16 employees)

We are going to ask you to try to put a dollar value on certain job creation scenarios for your
community. As you answer the following questions, please remember that the amount you are
willing to spend comes from limited funds. Since these are limited, if you answer that you would
be willing to spend taxpayer money and/or give a tax break for a job, you would have to give up
other goods or services or increase the amount of money you have available.

Q-9
Referring to the hypothetical example involving the software firm and given your service area=s
situation, would your community be willing to spend taxpayer money and/or give a tax break for
the 10 software jobs to locate in your service area today?
A. Yes → Proceed with Q-10
B. No → Proceed to Q-11

8

Statement was added following the pilot study. Survey results from the pilot study suggested adding the element would help
individuals determine a dollar amount more easily instead of opting for a percentage of the personal and property tax. Follow-up
surveys supported this addition.
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Q-10
Given your service area’s situation, how much would your community spend and/or give up in
tax receipts if the 10 software jobs located in your service area today?
$
Q-11
Given your service area’s situation, would your community be willing to spend taxpayer money
and/or give a tax break for 11 software jobs to locate in your service area in one year?
A. Yes → Proceed with Q-12
B. No → Proceed to Q-13
Q-12
Given your service area=s situation, how much would your community spend and/or give up for
the 11 software jobs to locate in your service area in one year?
$
Q-13
Given your service area’s situation, would your community be willing to spend taxpayer money
and/or give a tax break for 14 software jobs to locate in your service area in three years?
A. Yes → Proceed with Q-14
B. No → Proceed to Q-15
Q-14
Given your service area’s situation, how much would your community spend and/or give up in
tax receipts for the 14 software jobs to locate in your service area in three years?
$
Q-15
Given your service area’s situation, would your community be willing to spend taxpayer money
and/or give a tax break for 16 software jobs to locate in your service area in five years?
A. Yes → Proceed with Q-16
B. No → Proceed to Part III and Q-17
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Q-16
Given your service area’s situation, how much would your community spend or give up in tax
receipts for the 16 software jobs to locate in your service area in five years?

$

PART III
Q-17
Now keeping the software example in mind but ignoring all previous questions, if you gave a
$50,000 subsidy for the new software firm to relocate to your community would you be likely to
get any complaints?
A. Yes → Proceed with Q-18
B. No → Proceed to Q-19
Q-18
Which of the following forms of negative responses would you expect and pay the most
attention to?
Types of Response

Please circle Yes or
No

Letters to the editor of local papers

A. Yes

B. No

Local television news coverage

A. Yes

B. No

Phone calls to you

A. Yes

B. No

Loss of funding for your office

A. Yes

B. No

School board complaints

A. Yes

B. No

Other existing businesses

A. Yes

B. No

Local area official complaints

A. Yes

B. No

Personal visits to your office

A. Yes

B. No

Radio commentary

A. Yes

B. No

Q-19
If you gave a $50,000 subsidy to an existing firm in the community would you be likely to get
any complaints?
A. Yes → Proceed with Q-20
B. No → You have completed the survey!
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Q-20
Which of the following forms of negative responses would apply?

Types of Response

Please circle Yes or
No

Letters to the editor of local papers

A. Yes

B. No

Local television news coverage

A. Yes

B. No

Phone calls to you

A. Yes

B. No

Loss of funding for your office

A. Yes

B. No

School board complaints

A. Yes

B. No

Other existing businesses

A. Yes

B. No

Local area official complaints

A. Yes

B. No

Personal visits to your office

A. Yes

B. No

Radio commentary

A. Yes

B. No
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APPENDIX B
TELEPHONE SURVEY
TELEPHONE TEXT
Part A.
“Hello. My name is (first name). I’m calling from West Virginia University in
Morgantown, WV. We are conducting a survey about economic development in your
community. Would it be possible to speak to the adult in your household who has had
the most recent birthday?”
Note: If another person comes to the phone, insert this paragraph: “My name is (first
name). I’m calling from West Virginia University in Morgantown, WV. We are
conducting a survey about economic development in your community.”
“Could I take a few minutes to tell you about the survey?”
If yes, “Thank you.” (Continue with Part B.)
If no, “It will only take a few minutes. Your opinions are important because
economic development projects are funded with federal, state, and local tax dollars.
May I tell you a little about the survey?”
If no, “Thank you for your time.”
If yes, “Thank you.” (Continue with Part B.)
Part B.
“The purpose of this survey is to help us understand the value9 of jobs to your
community. The survey is part of a research project here at the university and focuses
on job development. We are not selling anything nor are we asking for a donation.
Your participation is voluntary and you do not have to answer any questions that you do
not want to answer. Your answers are confidential and you will not be identified in any
research. Also, feel free to give any feedback you feel could help the research team.
Would it be possible to ask you a few questions regarding your local economy?”
If no, “Thank you for your time and have a nice day.”
If yes, “Thank you.” (Continue with phone survey.)

9

Value means “we want to know if people think jobs in their community are important and if they might benefit from these jobs in
some indirect way.”
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PHONE SURVEY

Please consider the following situation:
There is a software company currently interested in building in your area. The company
has a solid future and is on the cutting edge of new computer techniques. The
company has purchased an option on land in your service area. The average wage for
an employee at the software company is $25,000 plus a $5,000 benefit package. You
received information that the company may move today or they might move five years
from now. The company has also released the following:
1. The company currently has 10 employees and if it moves today they do not expect
any new jobs to be created; and
2. If management waits five years to move the company, it is expected to have
openings for 6 new employees for a total of 16 employees.
Q-1
Referring to the hypothetical example involving the software firm, if you had your choice
of alternatives, when would you like the software company to move to you area?
Today
5 years from now
Never
Either today or later; no preference
Don’t know
Refused
We are going to ask you to try to put a dollar value on a certain job scenario for your
community. As you answer the following questions, please remember that the amount
you are willing to spend comes from limited resources. Since this is limited, if you
answer that you would be willing to spend for a job, you would have to give up other
goods or services or decrease the amount of income you have available. Also, assume
that neither you nor anyone in your family would get the new jobs.
Q-2
Referring to the hypothetical example involving the software firm and given your
community’s situation, would you be willing to increase the amount you pay in taxes for
software jobs to locate in your community today?
Yes Proceed With Q-3
No Proceed To Q-4
Don’t know
Refused
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Q-3
Given your community’s situation, would you be willing to pay “x-dollars” in taxes for the
“x-number” software jobs to locate in your community today?
Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
Q-4
Regardless of how much money you would be willing to spend to bring jobs into your
community, if the firm was given a $50,000 subsidy to relocate to would you be likely to
complain?
Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
Q-5
Regardless of how much money you would be willing to spend to bring jobs into your
community, if a $50,000 subsidy was given to an existing firm in the community would
you be likely to complain?
Yes
No
Don’t know
Refused
Q-6
If certain types of economic development techniques were implemented by your service
area representatives to help build your economy, you would have an opinion related to
their actions. Considering each technique as separate and without considering
combinations of two or more, how would your prioritize the following types of economic
development techniques? Please rank from 1 (highest) to 8 (lowest) and use each
number only once.
Which one of the following (read from development techniques) would you rank as 1?
(delete this choice from the next answer list)
Which one of the following (read from 7 development techniques left) would you rank as
2? (also delete this choice from the next answer list)
Which one of the following (read from 6 development techniques left) would you rank as
3? (also delete this choice from the next answer list)
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Which one of the following (read from 5 development techniques left) would you rank as
4? (also delete this choice from the next answer list)
Which one of the following (read from 4 development techniques left) would you rank as
5? (also delete this choice from the next answer list)
Which one of the following (read from 3 development techniques left) would you rank as
6? (also delete this choice from the next answer list)
Which one of the following (read from 2 development techniques left) would you rank as
7? (also delete this choice from the next answer list)
Development Technique Listing
Recruiting business from outside the area
Expanding existing businesses
Promoting area as a tourist destination
Promoting area as a retirement destination
Developing infrastructure
Investing in business startups
Investing in worker training
Creating communication networks between businesses
So you would rank (insert the one development technique that is left) as 8 correct?
A.Yes B. No
Don’t know
Refused
The following questions will help us to determine if the sample of surveys returned is
representative of the entire population. As with all your answers to the survey questions,
your answers to these questions are strictly confidential. You will not be identified in any
analysis nor in the presentation of the study results.
Q-7
Are you:
Male
Female
Don’t know
Refused
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Q-8
What is your age?
16-19
26-30
41-50
61-65
71+
Don’t know

20-25
31-40
51-60
65-70
Refused

Q-9
In what county do you live?
Don’t know
Refused
Q-10
How long have you lived in the area?
Don’t know
Refused
Q-11
How many children under age 5 live in your household?
Don’t know
Refused
Q-12
How many children between the ages of 5 and 18 live in your household?
Don’t know
Refused
Q-13
How many times have you voted in the last 3 years?
0
1 time
2 times
3 times
More than 3
Don’t know
Refused
Q-14
Do you own your own home or do you rent?
Own
Rent
Don’t know
Refused
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Q-15
What is the highest year of formal schooling you have completed? (Please circle)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Elementary

7 8 9
Jr. High

10 11 12
High School

13 14 15 16
College or
Vocational School

17 18 19 20
Graduate or
Professional

Refused
Q-16
Is your total household income more than $30,000 a year?
A. Yes Proceed with Q-17
B. No Proceed to Q-18
C. Don’t Know Proceed to Part C
D. Refused Proceed to Part C
Q-17
I am going to mention a number of income categories. When I mention the category
which describes your total household income in the last 12 months, please stop me.
$30,000 to less than $40,000
$40,000 to less than $50,000
$50,000 to less than $60,000
$60,000 to less than $70,000
$70,000 to less than $80,000
$80,000 or more
Don’t Know Proceed with Part C
Refused Proceed with Part C
Q-18
I am going to mention a number of income categories. When I mention the category
which describes your total household income in the last 12 months, please stop me.
Less than $5,000
$5,000 to less than $10,000
$10,000 to less than $15,000
$15,000 to less than $20,000
$20,000 to less than $25,000
$25,000 to less than $30,000
Don’t Know Proceed with Part C
Refused Proceed with Part C
Part C.
Those are all the questions I have for you. Thank you for taking the time to participate
in this survey. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. Have a nice
.

68

ABSTRACT
Academic research in the area of economic development policy is
overwhelmingly critical of industrial recruitment, recommending instead that resources be
directed towards strategies such as business retention and expansion, fostering local
entrepreneurship, and amenity development. This research moves beyond criticizing
industrial recruitment policy and explores one potential reason, a high discount rate, for
practitioners’ reliance on recruitment over other available local development techniques.
The research also investigates developer’s probability of success for industrial
recruitment as well as alternative development strategies and examines whether
economic developer use of incentive packages to recruit local businesses is a rational
decision, i.e., supported by the general public. A mail survey of local economic
development practitioners estimates their discount rate while a phone survey takes a
look at citizen preferences. A review of trends in recruitment and the academic
arguments against the practice are reviewed. How a high discount rate might be a
strong reason for local economic developers to prefer industrial recruitment to other
policies will then be discussed.
Survey design and results of a pilot study from surveying Ohio economic
developers are addressed including a discussion of changes made to the design of the
survey instrument. Survey results are presented estimating the discount rate of local
economic development officials in Ohio, Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Differences regarding odds of success and developer willingness to pay as well as
preferences of citizens and development officials are included.
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